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1 INTRODUCTION
Seigniorage, the government’s revenue from money
creation, has been a source of finance for countries from
the past to the present. The article focuses on the future
of it as a new EU tax to finance the budget of the Union.
2 SEIGNIORAGE
The European Union wants true new own resources.
From a list of six taxes in 2010, the Commission
selected in 2011: a financial transaction tax (FTT) and
an EU VAT. Seigniorage, though once seen as a
promising candidate and being able to furnish the
European budget in full has fallen out of grace. It has
become a footnote to the EU’s latest proposal.
The word seigniorage sounds outlandish but the
phenomenon that goes behind it is as real as it ever was.
In the Middle Ages, seigniorage was a prerogative of the
Crown. The seigneur claimed a percentage upon the
bullion brought to the mint to be coined or to be
exchanged for coin.1 Seigniorage became such a
lucrative source of income that seigneurs often
mandated yearly recoinage. In England, after the year
1000 over a period of 150 years, rulers changed their
coinage at least 53 times.2 Seigniorage is also a type of
revenue governments earn because of their monopoly
power over currency production.
Nowadays, the returns from currency issue are three-
fold. First, it is the difference between the face value of a
coin or banknote and its production costs. The
difference between the face value of paper money and its
marginal printing cost are almost equal to the face value
of the note.3 The cost of printing banknotes in the US is
estimated to be about four cents for a newly printed
banknote.4
Second, it consists of the returns on the investments
of the balances commercial banks have to hold at their
National Central Banks (NCBs) as a counterpart to the
total amount of banknotes in circulation. In the euro
zone, in 2011, the total value of the banknotes in
circulation was about EUR 890 billion.5
Third, it is the economic disadvantage suffered by a
holder of cash, due to the effects of expansionary
monetary policy. In the long run, inflation is mainly the
result of the issue of money above the amount necessary
to finance the growth in trade. Essentially, inflation is an
indirect income tax, since it causes a decline in the
purchasing power of the public’s income.
Because of the just-said, there are three measures of
seigniorage.6 First, the change in the monetary base: the
currency and central bank deposits that together provide
the base for the money supply. Second, the proceeds
earned by the NCBs of investing resources obtained by
the past issuance of money in interest-bearing assets.
Third, the pertaining rate of inflation.7 Since we are
interested in the fiscal aspect of seigniorage, we mainly
look at the second measure of seigniorage.8 At present,
the proceeds flow to the NCBs of the Member States and
the European Central Bank (ECB) of the Eurosystem. In
the end, the proceeds go to the governments of the euro-
zone countries.9
All over the world, the average reliance of
governments on seigniorage, measured as the ratio of
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seigniorage revenue to governmental expenditures,
varied for the period 1965–1994 from a minimum of
1% to a maximum of 31%.10 In Europe, it was on
average a little above 5% in the sixties and seventies of
the last century.11 In Western Europe, as a percent of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it was about 0.5% for
the period 1971–1990.12
In recent decades, seigniorage has always been
mentioned as a new own resource for the Union.13
Rather than taxes with a national dimension, in the
famous Sapir rapport,14 seigniorage was an example of a
tax with a clear EU dimension: taxes that are either
related to an EU policy so they cannot be meaningfully
be reapportioned nationally or to have a mobile tax base
within the EU. On principle, they should directly accrue
to the Union. It was estimated that even a part of it
could furnish the financing needs of the Union. In
recent studies, however, seigniorage has disappeared as
an option for an EU tax. The reasons are that not all
Member States do participate in the euro zone, the
revenues should be small and volatile, and institutional
opposition from especially the ECB.15
3 ASSESSMENT
3.1. On the Positive Site
Several characteristics of seigniorage do make it a
candidate for a EU tax. First, the fundamental reason for
assigning seigniorage to the Union is that it is linked to a
unique key European policy. In the history of the EU,
the introduction of the euro in 2002 is a new common
EU policy on par with the introduction of the Common
Agricultural Policy and the one internal market. The
revenue the euro zone raises by printing money is not
simply the result of adding-up the revenues the Member
States generated before with their currencies. Most
currencies did not have the status of an international
reserve currency. In other words, in an integrated
currency area there is no obvious key for apportioning
seigniorage to Member States. Just as the custom duties
collected at EU ports do not belong to the Member
States in which the ports are situated. It is a common
good of the Member States taking part in the Union.16
Second, seigniorage revenues are considerable. It
flows from the income derived by the NCBs and the
ECB from certain earmarked assets held against notes in
circulation and deposit liabilities to credit institutions.17
In 2001 for the Eurosystem, seigniorage was estimated
to be about EUR 10 billion.18 At present, an estimate of
just the yearly change in the stock of money in the
Eurosystem is about EUR 50 billion. For Willem Buiter
this is essentially free money for the Union.19 Begg et al.
estimate seigniorage could provide between 4% and
40% of the annual EU budget.20 In the short run,
however, seigniorage revenues can be volatile. They
depend on the demand for cash balances and prevailing
interest rates; both are notably affected by the business
cycle.21 Over time, the revenues are about 0.25% of
GNP.22 In the future, however, changes in payments
habits and the generalized use of electronic means of
payments, the rising cashless society, might erode the tax
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as an international currency may contribute to
seigniorage through increased circulation of euro notes
outside the euro area. In the case of the US, about half of
the dollar bills are used outside the US24
In sum, it seems safe to estimate the revenues from
seigniorage to be, on average, a quarter of the total GNP
of the Union, that is, about a quarter of the EU budget.25
At this moment, however, the amount of seigniorage as
generated by the euro is not at its maximum. This, since
only 17 of the 27 Member States participate in the
eurozone, Mutatis mutandis, it could grow to about a
third of the budget.26
Third, an advantage of seigniorage, none of the other
proposed EU taxes can match, are its low collection
costs and possibilities for fraud. The tax-collection
points are limited to the NCBs that use the euro and the
ECB.27 Fraud should be non-existent due to the
transparency of Central Banks activities.
3.1 On the Negative Site
Given the present crisis in the euro zone, it goes without
saying, that the existence of the euro is an essential
precondition for this EU tax.
This being said, seigniorage has other drawbacks.
One of the main problems is that the autonomy seems to
be threatened of the NCBs and the ECB. Not just
monetary but fiscal policy too could become an aim of
the ECB: to furnish the Union with monetary income
(seigniorage). The monetary goal of the ECB, to
maintain price stability, would be in danger. Besides
that, for the NCBs seigniorage is a long run reliable
income source that helps central banks to maintain their
financial independence.28 For these reasons, the ECB
and NCBs are opposed to seigniorage as a new EU tax.29
The argument, however, looks like a sophism. We are
looking at the monetary income of the ECB to the
European Union. We are not discussing the turnaround
that the Union pays to the ECB. When seigniorage goes
to the EU, it is not different as it was before the
introduction of the euro: the NCBs had to give
seigniorage to the central governments and private
shareholders. The financial and operational autonomy of
the ECB remain the same.30 Besides that, if seigniorage
would flow to the Union, the ECB and NCBs still do
have other sources of income. Though, of course, the
ECB and the NCBs can keep part of seigniorage as
handling costs in view of their currency function. Just
like Member States retain part of the collected custom
duties.
From a legal point of view, a solution has to be found
for the different legal structures of the NCBs. In most
Member States, the state is the only shareholder of the
NCB. In Belgium, Austria and Italy, however, there are
only, or next to the state, private shareholders. All
shareholders have a claim to the dividend and hence to
the seigniorage; they must be compensated. In addition,
the statutes of the European Central Bank has to be
changed. The statute, Article 33.1 (b), obliges that
seigniorage has to be shared with the NCBs.
Finally, the European Union must find a solution for
those states that do not, out of principle or yet, use the
euro. Member States, save The United Kingdom and
Denmark, do have the obligation, when fulfilling the
criteria, to adopt the euro. Seigniorage, also, would
involve a temporary two-tier mechanism: a different
treatment is imposed on euro zone and non euro-zone
members.31 In the literature, two suggestions are made
to handle this problem. A simple solution would be to
let the states outside the euro zone pay according to
their GNP. The overall ECB seigniorage is deducted from
the GNP contributions of the euro-zone members.32
Goulard and Nava give a more complicated
proposal.33 States not yet participating should pay a
share of their GDP, which is calculated by a formula
constituted of a linear combination of the share of
the ECB seigniorage in the GDP of the euro zone and the
share of the country’s central banks profits in the
country’s GDP.34 The weighting of both parts would be
a political decision. As the central banks outside
the euro zone usually generate higher profits due to
higher inflation, a higher waiting of the second part
would increase the contributions of those countries.
4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The introduction of seigniorage as an EU tax is no one-
way bet. On the one hand, it can raise about a third of
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the EU budget. Since it is collected at the level of the
ECB and NCBs of the euro area, collection can be done
almost costless and fraud-free. Moreover, seigniorage
belongs to the Union. It is generated by a unique,
policy-driven common EU policy: the European
Monetary Union. For this reason, as has been said, it is
only a matter of time before the monetary revenues of
the Eurosystem are assigned to the EU.35 On the other
hand, next to some legal and practical problems,
seigniorage faces opposition from the NCBs and ECB.
What can tip the balance in favour of seigniorage
compared to an FTT and an EU VAT, the both by the
Commission preferred taxes? One of the main obstacles
to the introduction of those taxes: the loss of the fiscal
sovereignty of the Member States, is not relevant for
seigniorage. In 1992 with the introduction of the
European Monetary Union, the Member States gave up
their sovereignty on monetary policy.
In short, for a new EU tax it is possible to go back to
almost square one of modern monetary history:
seigniorage. By its own strength and by default of the
proposed EU taxes, seigniorage could become an option.
As John Maynard Keynes said: ‘A government can live
by this means when it can live by no other. It is the form
of taxation which the public find hardest to evade and
even the weakest government can enforce, when it can
enforce nothing else’.36
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